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This paper introduces a type of generalized Kolmogorov complexity and uses it as a tool to 
explore the consequences of several assumptions about the existence of secure pseudorandom 
generators. It is shown that if secure generators exist, then there are fast deterministic 
simulations of probabilistic algorithms; the nature of the simulations and the class of 
probabilistic algorithms for which simulations can be exhibited depends on the notion of 
“security” which is assumed. One goal of the investigation begun here is to show that many 
important questions in complexity theory may be viewed as questions about the Kolmogorov 
complexity of sets in P. 0 1989 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A pseudorandom generator is an efficient routine which takes a short input 
(the seed) and produces a long (pseudorandom) output. Since the pseudorandom 
output is produced efficiently from a short input, the output of a pseudorandom 
generator consists of strings of low generalized Kolmogorov complexity. If the 
pseudorandom generator is secure, then feasible adversaries are unable to 
distinguish truly random input from pseudorandom input. Thus the existence of 
pseudorandom generators says something about the ability of feasible processes to 
distinguish strings of high and low generalized Kolmogorov complexity. 
Building on the intuition in the preceding paragraph, this paper examines several 
hypothesis about the security of pseudorandom generators and derives for each 
hypothesis a necessary condition in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. Using these 
conditions, a number of new results are proved which relate the security of 
pseudorandom generators to the existence of fast deterministic simulations of 
probabilistic computations. 
The following two hypotheses are common in work relating to pseudorandom 
number generation: 
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HYPOTHESIS 1. There exist generators which are secure against probabilistic 
polynomial time statistical tests. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (The strong hypothesis). There exi$ generators which are secure 
against PJpoly statistical tests. 
In his fundamental paper [39], Yao considered both hypotheses. Most of the 
results of [39] were stated in terms of Hypothesis 1. However, in order to prove 
results about probabilistic complexity classes, the stronger hypothesis was needed. 
Yao’s result, as improved by [12], states that 
Hypothesis 2 3 V’E > 0 BPP c DTIME(2”“). 
It is not known if Hypothesis 2 can be replaced by Hypothesis 1 in this result. 
However, a result with a somewhat similar flavor is proved in Section 6: 
Result: Hypothesis 1 * VE > 0 BPTIME(2°(“2’) E DTIME(22”2). 
One of the major thrusts of this investigation involves the consideration of the 
existence of generators which are secure against probabilistic adversaries which are 
allowed more than polynomial time. There are a number of reasons for doing this: 
1. Certain relationships between Kolmogorov complexity and pseudorandom 
generators become clearer when strong notions of security are used. 
2. Proof techniques which are useful for studying pseudorandom generators 
under polynomial-time security assumptions seem to be different from the techni- 
ques which are useful for studying pseudorandom generators which are secure 
against more powerful adversaries. 
3. Little is known about which security assumptions are reasonable and 
which are too strong. By examining strong assumptions about security, we can 
hope to identify which assumptions are reasonable. 
4. In some cryptographic applications of pseudorandom generators, it may 
be advisable to consider adversaries who have more than polynomial-bounded 
resources. 
To this end, we consider new hypotheses, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, which 
(informally) say that there exists some E >O and some pseudorandom generator 
which is secure against all statistical tests computable by probabilistic 2”” time- 
bounded machines, or circuits of size 2”“, respectively. We show that Hypothesis 
3 j RTIME(2°‘2”‘) = DTIME(2°‘2”‘), and Hypothesis 4 * RP = P. 
If one believes that probabilistic computation is more powerful than deterministic 
computation, then these results can be taken as evidence that Hypotheses 3 and 4 
are unlikely to be true. On the other hand, it should be noted that some researchers 
have conjectured that RP = P [9]. 
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Although Hypothesis 3 is very strong, we note that it is probably not strong 
enough to imply Hypothesis 2. 
Since the proofs of these results use intermediate lemmas about Kolmogorov 
complexity, we are able to prove a number of other results about the structure of 
complexity classes, under the assumption that secure generators exist. For example, 
we show that Hypothesis 3 implies that every dense set in RP has an infinite 
P-printable subset, Thus, for instance, our results show that there is an infinite 
P-printable set of primes, assuming that very secure pseudorandom generators 
exist. (Note in this regard that it has only recently been proved that there is an 
infinite set of primes in P [31].) Also, we show that Hypothesis 1 implies a certain 
immunity property for all dense sets in RP. 
In order to make efficient use of Kolmogorov complexity as a tool in proving 
these results, we define, for each set L, a function K,(n) which measures the com- 
plexity of the simplest strings of length n in L. This definition is built on the notions 
of generalized Kolmogorov complexity proposed by Hartmanis [lS] and Levin 
WI. 
The general technique used to prove the results mentioned above consists of two 
parts. First, one shows that if secure pseudorandom generators exist, then K,(n) 
grows slowly for every dense set L in P. Then, one shows that if K,(n) grows slowly 
for all dense sets in P, then there are fast deterministic simulations of probabilistic 
computations. 
Once a connection has been established between probabilistic complexity classes 
on the one hand, and the rate of growth of K,(n) for dense sets L in P on the other 
hand, it is a small step to relate the complexity of sets in NP and NE to the rate of 
growth of K,(n) for all sets L in P (not just the dense sets). Thus, for example, we 
can show that if there are sets in NE which require doubly exponential time to 
recognize determinisitically, then there are sets L in P for which K,(n) is large. 
These observations raise some interesting questions. For instance, note that every 
string in a sparse set in P has a short description (namely, its index in that set). 
Thus there is some reason to suspect that K,(n) might grow more slowly for sparse 
sets in P than for dense sets. That is, if M is a polynomial-time machine which 
“singles out” a few strings of length n, it might seem reasonable to guess that those 
strings must be relatively simple. 
On the other hand, either this intuition is wrong, or some popular conjectures 
are false, since results in this paper show that one of the following three things must 
happen: 
1. Hypothesis 2 is false. 
2. There are fast deterministic simulations for all sets in NE. 
3. There is some non-dense set L in P and some E such that K,(n) > n’ i.o.. 
but K,(n) < ns for all 6 and all dense L in P (and even for all L in P/poly). 
In Section 2, we present some basic definitions and establish notation. In Section 
3, we review concepts and definitions related to the theory of pseudorandom 
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generators. In Section 4, the notion of generalized Kolmogorov complexity is 
reviewed, and the function K,(n), which measures the Kolmogorov complexity of 
the set L, is defined. 
In Section 5, results are proved which relate the security of pseudorandom 
generators to the Kolmogorov complexity of sets in P and P/poly. In Section 6, we 
present results which relate the Kolmogorov complexity of sets in P to a number of 
open problems in complexity theory. For example, we show that 
1. (VL E P, K,(n) = O(log n)) =z. E = NE 
2. (VL E P, K,(n) # o(log n)) * DTIME(t(n)) & NP, for any time-construc- 
tible superpolynomial t 
3. (V(E > 0, VL E P, K,(n) # o(n’)) =z. Va > 0, DTIME(2”“) & NP. 
4. RP & DTIME(2”‘) * 36, 3L E P/poly, L is a.e. dense and K,(n) = w(&. 
Section 7 contains results relating immunity properties of RP to the existence of 
secure pseudorandom generators. Finally, in Section 8 we discuss open problems 
and conclusions. 
2. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we present some basic definitions, and we review concepts related 
to pseudorandom generators. 
All sets considered in this paper are subsets of (0, 1 } *. For all strings x, 1x1 
denotes the length of x. For a set S, (SI denotes the cardinality of S. For a set 
L c Z*, L=” denotes LA Z”. We make use of the usual correspondence between 
{ 0, 1 } * and the positive integers; namely, the string x will denote the integer whose 
binary representation is lx. Thus, for example, we may write 1x1 = Llog x _I. We will 
use a one-one pairing function mapping (0, 1 } * x (0, 1 } * onto (0, I} *, and for 
inputs x and y, we will denote the output of the pairing function by (x, y). 
The census cL(n) of a set L is the number of strings in L of lenth n. We say L is 
sparse if cL(n) = n O(l) L is a tally set if L c O*. An important class of sparse sets are . 
the P-printable sets. A set L is P-printable if there is a deterministic Turing machine 
which, on input n, runs in time polynomial in n and prints out a list of all the 
elements of L of length at most n. P-printable sets were defined in [ 193; a number 
of results relating to P-printable sets may be found in [3]. 
The density d,(n) of L is c,(n)/2”. We will say that L is dense if for some k, L has 
density an pk i.o. We will also have occasion to refer to sets which satisfy a 
stronger density requirement: we say that L is a.e. dense if L is infinite and for some 
k and for all large n, L=” # 0 *d,(n) >nek. Notice that a.e. dense sets may 
contain no strings of many lengths n, however if L is a.e. dense and contains some 
strings of length n, then it contains many strings of length n. 
We shall have occasion to make statements of the form “g= O(f)” or 
“g = w(f)“, where g(n) is undefined for some n. The assertion “g = O(j)” will thus 
mean there exists some c such that for all large n, g(n) defined-g(n) <cf(n). 
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Similarly, “g # o(f)” means that there exists some c and there are infinitely many n 
such that g(n) is defined, and g(n) -C cf(n). 
The reader is expected to be familiar with deterministic, nondeterministic, and 
probabilistic Turing machines, and with complexity classes such as RP, BPP, NP, 
etc. For background, the reader is directed to [33 or 211. 
A function t: N + N is said to be time-constructible if there is some Turing 
machine which, on all inputs of length n, runs for exactly t(n) steps. 
We let E = DTime(2°(“‘), and NE = NTime(2 OCn)). We will also need to refer to 
complexity classes defined in terms of probabilistic machines which run in exponen- 
tial time. We let BPTime(T(n))) denote the class of languages L for which there 
exists some probabilistic Turing machine M which runs in time T(n) such that 
x E L + Prob(M accepts x) > $ and x $ L => Prob(M accepts x) < f. Similarly, we 
define RTime(T(n)) to be the class of languages L for which there exists some 
probabilistic Turing machine M which runs in time T(n) such that XE L =z= 
Prob(M accepts x) > $ and x $ L * Prob(M accepts x) = 0. 
3. PSEUDORANDOM GENERATORS 
A pseudorandom generator is an algorithm which runs in polynomial time, takes 
a string of length n (the random seed) as input, and produces a string of length nk 
(the pseudorandom sequence) as output, where k > 1. In order to be acceptable for 
many purposes, the pseudorandom sequences produced by a pseudorandom 
generator should satisfy certain statistical properties, and it should be difficult for 
any adversary, given the initial segment of a pseudorandom sequence, to predict 
which bit will be produced next by the generator. Important papers which have 
dealt with pseudorandom generators from a complexity-theoretic point of view 
include [35, 39, 17, 11,27, 12, 291. 
The following definitions are essentially those of [39]. A T(n) statistical test is a 
probabilistic algorithm which runs in time T(n). Given any generator g and 
statistical test A, we will be interested in how the behavior of A on pseudorandom 
strings compares with the behavior of A on truly random strings. Suppose g takes 
seeds of length n and produces pseudorandom sequences of length nk. Define 
PAJR) to be the probability that A accepts x, where x is a string of length nk (all 
strings of length nk being equally likely). Define P ,&PSg) to be the probability 
that A accepts g(s), where s is a seed of length n (all seeds of length n being equally 
likely). We say that g passes the (T(n), e(n)) test A if jPA,nk(R) - P,&PSg)l < e(n) 
for all large enough n. That is, g passes the (T(n), e(n)) test A if A behaves roughly 
the same on g’s pseudorandom output as on truly random strings. (Warning: a 
possible point of confusion is that n is the length of the seed, i.e., n is the length of 
the input to the generator g, rather than the length of the input to the test A. By 
adopting this convention, calculations are simplified, and certain lemmas are easier 
to state.) 
We say that g is (T(n), e(n)) secure if it passes every (T(n), e(n)) statistical test, 
and g is polynomially secure if it is (nk, n --“) secure for every k. 
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There are other notions of security which have been studied. For example, in 
[ 11,391 a next bit test was also considered. A generator g fails a (T(n), e(n)) next 
bit test A if A is a probabilistic algorithm which runs in time T(n) and if there are 
infinitely many n such that A, when given an initial segment of a pseudorandom 
string of length nk, can predict the next bit with success rate >t + e(n). It was 
shown in [39] that a generator g is polynomially secure iff it passes all (nk, n-“) 
next bit tests. See also [ 121 for a nice proof of this fact. 
Pseudorandom generators are closely linked to one-way functions: i.e., functions 
which are easy to compute but are hard to invert. Purported one-way functions 
were used in [35, 39, 1 l] to construct pseudorandom generators. Levin [27] 
showed that the existence of polynomially secure pseudorandom generators is in 
fact equivalent to the existence of a certain type of one-way function; see [12] for 
nice proofs of some of Levin’s results. 
Boppana and Hirschfeld [12] introduced the notion of an extender, which is 
closely related to the notion of one-way functions. An extender is a function com- 
putable in polynomial time which takes input of length n and produces output of 
length n + 1. Thus an extender is a pseudorandom generator whose pseudorandom 
sequences are only one bit longer than the seed. The notion of security for extenders 
is defined in exactly the same way as for generators. That is, an extender g is (T(n), 
e(n)) secure if it passes every (T(n), e(n)) statistical test, and g is polynomially 
secure if it is (nk, nek) secure for every k. It is shown in [I23 that polynomially 
secure generators exist iff polynomially secure extenders exist. 
The technique whereby a secure extender is transformed into a secure generator 
is required in a number of the proofs in this paper. To simplify those proofs, it 
is useful to set up some machinery here. What follows is a generalization of a 
technique used in [ 12, 39, 111. 
DEFINITION. Let x be any string of length n. Define head(x) to be the first bit of 
x, and tail(x) to be the suffix of x of length n - 1. Let g be an extender. Define 
bi = head ago [tail og]‘- ‘(x). For any r E N define g,(x) = b,(x) &(x) . . .b,(x). In 
other words, g,(x) is the sequence of r bits which results by computing g(x), 
removing the first bit and applying g to the result, and repeating the process r 
times. 
Given a language L, an extender g, and a number r, we denote by T(L, g, r) the 
statistical test which, on input x of length n + 1, does as follows: 
Begin 
Probabilistically choose i E (0, . . . . r - I} 
Probabilistically choose z E r - i - ’ 
Let y = g,(x), and let b = head (x) 
Accept iff zby E L 
End 
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LEMMA 1. P w,g,r~n+,(R) - Pw,g,r~,n+~ (Psg) = [dL(r) - ProMgAy) E 
Proof. Let pi denote the probability that T(L, g, r) accepts I’ E Z”+ ‘, given that z 
is chosen in step 1, where all y are equally likely. Clearly, PTCL, g, rj, n + ,(R) = Cipj/r. 
Similarly, let qi denote the probability that T(L, g, r) accepts f(x)~C”+‘, given 
that i is chosen in step 1, where all x E C” are equally likely. Again, clearly 
P ~(~,~,~),~+*(PSg)=C,qilr. 
The crucial fact to note is that pi+ I =qi for O<i<r-2, and p,=d,(r) 
and qr-I=Prob(g,(y)ELlyE~“). Thus PT(L,~,~~.~+*(R)-PT.(L,~,~).,~+I(PS~:)= 
&(p, - qi))/r = (pO - qr_ ,)/r. The result follows. m 
Note that, in the proof of Lemma 1, it was assumed that the number i could be 
chosen in the range (0, . . . . r - 1 } with all i being equally likely to be chosen. 
Depending on the model of a probabilistic Turing machine being used, that may or 
may not be possible. However, on all reasonable models of probabilistic Turing 
machine, it is possible to choose i so that all i are approximately equally likely to be 
chosen, so that, on such models of computation, the statement of Lemma 1 is true 
modulo some insignificant terms which we find it convenient to ignore. The 
interested reader may verify that all theorems and corollaries proved in this paper 
remain true without this simplifying assumption. 
We remark that, although presented as a probabilistic algorithm, T(L, r, g) can 
also be implemented as a circuit, where the size of the circuit is determined by the 
complexity of computing g, and by the complexity of determining membership in L. 
(The probabilistic aspects can be removed by “hardwiring” in the optimal choices 
for i and Z. For examples of arguments of this sort, see [ 121.) 
Since secure generators exist iff secure extenders exist iff certain kinds of one-way 
functions exist, hypotheses about pseudorandom generators can be expressed using 
any of these notions. To simplify the statement of certain results, this paper expresses 
all such hypotheses in terms of extenders. 
Up to this point, we have considered only statistical tests computable by 
probabilistic algorithms. A number of papers dealing with pseudorandom 
generators have used a much stronger notion of security (e.g., [ 11, 39,121). A 
strong T(n) statistical test is an algorithm computed by a circuit of size T(n). A 
generator is strongly polynomially secure if it passes all strong (nk, n -“) statistical 
tests. All of the results mentioned so far are also true in the context of strong 
statistical tests. For instance, a generator is secure against next bit tests computed 
by poly-size circuits iff it is strongly polynomially secure, and strongly polynomially 
secure generators exist iff strongly polynomially secure extenders exist. 
However, in some cases, the strong notion of security is necessary in order to 
achieve the desired results. For instance, Yao shows in [39] that if strongly 
polynomially secure pseudorandom generators exist, then every language in RP has 
subexponential time complexity. His proof relies heavily on the strong hypothesis of 
security. 
Little is known about how secure it is possible for an extender to be. Clearly, if 
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P = NP, then no extender is polynomially secure, since if P = NP it would be 
possible to recognize the range of the extender in polynomial time. For essentially 
the same reason, no extender computable in time nk is (2”nk, f) secure. When less 
than exponential time is allowed, however, the bounds on security which we are 
able to prove plummet quickly. The following proposition seems to be the best 
bound which is known. 
PROPOSITION 2. No extender computable in time nk is (2”“, 2-C(1-E)n+k’ogn1) 
secure, for any E > 0. 
Proof Let g be any extender computable in time nk. Consider the 2”” test A 
which, on input y of length n + 1 probabilistically guesses a set SC .Y of size 
r = 2(2”“/nk), and computes g(x) for all x E S, accepting if g(x) = y for some x: 
r =- 
p+l 
P . . . ..(PSg)+++ 
I 
Thus P,,.+,(PSg)-P,,“+,(R)~r/2”+‘=2-[(i-”)”+k’og”l. 1 
Using similar analysis, one can show that no extender g is strongly 
(2”“, 2-(‘-‘)“) secure. (The circuit can have elements of range(g) encoded directly 
in it; this elimates the need to compute g, and thus eliminates the factor of k log n.) 
It would be interesting to know if there can be extenders which meet the security 
bounds, or if there is any strategy which is significantly better than the na’ive 
strategy outlined above. Results presented later in this paper indicate that, in par- 
ticular, it would be interesting to know if it is possible for there to be extenders 
which are strongly (2”“, 2-9 secure for some E > 0. (Proposition 2 shows that, for 
this to happen, it must be that E < 4.) If such secure extenders exist, then RP = P 
(Corollary 3 1). 
We can now state the four hypotheses about security of pseudorandom 
generators which we will use in the rest of the paper: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. There exist extenders computable in polynomial time which are 
polynomially secure. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2. There exist extenders computable in polynomial time which are 
strongly polynomlally secure. 
HYPOTHESIS 3. There exists an extender computable in polynomial time which is 
(2”“, 2 -“) secure, for some E > 0. 
HYPOTHESIS 4. There exists an extender computable in polynomial time which is 
strongly (2”“, 2 En) secure, for some 8 > 0. 
We should mention that other notions of pseudorandomness have been con- 
sidered in the literature. Ko [22] and Wilber [38] consider infinite pseudorandom 
sequences. Longpre [29] compares the notion of infinite pseudorandom sequences 
to the notion of pseudorandom generators considered here. Pseudorandom 
generators which are secure relative to circuits of restricted depth were considered 
in [32, 61. 
4. TIME-BOUNDED KOLMGGGROV COMPLEXITY 
In this section we review concepts related to Kolmogorov complexity and define 
a new measure of the time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity of a set. 
There have been many attempts to give a rigorous definition for the informal 
concept of “randomness.” One approach which has met with some success is to 
consider a string of length n to be random if it has no description of length less 
than n. This is the approach of Kolmogorov complexity (see, e.g., [24, 131). 
Kolmogorov complexity provides a framework for studying the complexity of 
finite objects. This theory has proved useful in simplifying counting arguments in 
proving lower bounds (e.g., [28]) and has appealing parallels to information theory 
[14]. Nonetheless, a shortcoming of Kolmogorov complexity is that it is based on 
recursion theory and fails to take time and space complexity into consideration. 
That is, a string has small Kolmogorov complexity if it can be constructed (effec- 
tively) from only a few bits of information, even if the construction process requires 
an enormous amount of resources. A number of researchers have considered 
variants of Kolmogorov complexity which deal explicitly with issues of time and 
space complexity [l, 20, 22, 30, 36, 371. We will be most concerned with the 
definitions proposed by Hartmanis [ 181 and Levin [26]. 
Let M, be a Turing machine. Following [18], define K,[s(n), r(n)] to be 
{x~ (0, l}*: 3y~ (0, l}*, 1yJ <s(lxl) and M, prints x on input y in <t(lxl) steps}. 
That is, K,[s(n), t(n)] is the set of strings which can be “recovered” by M, in time 
t(n) from strings of length <s(n). It was shown in [lS] that there is a machine M, 
(called a universal Turing machine) such that for all v there is a constant c such 
that for all s and t K,[s(n), t(n)] G K,[s(n) + c, et(n) log t(n)+ c]. We will let 
K[s(n), t(n)] denote K,[s(n), t(n)]. Many recent papers deal with this notion of 
generalized Kolmogorov complexity, including [3, 7, 23, 291. 
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A much older notion of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity was used by 
Levin in [25] and was defined more formally in [26]. We restate that definition 
here. Let M, be the universal Turing machine considered above. Define Kt(x) to be 
min{ IpJ + log t: M, prints x in Q t steps on input p}. Similarly, we define Kt(xl y) 
to be min{ IpI + log I: M, prints x in <t steps on input (p, y)}. 
The following proposition, which is implicit in [25 j, illustrates the nature of the 
measure Kt. 
PROPOSITION 3. Let L E NP - DTIME(t(n)), and let Q be a linear-time predicate 
such that x E Lo 3yQ(x, y). Then there exists an infinite sequence x1, x2, . . . of 
strings in L such that Vx,Vy (Q(xi, y) a Kt(y 1 x) > log JG). 
ProoJ Assume that no such infinite sequence exists. That is, for all large x in L 
3y( Q(x, y) A Kt( y 1 x) d log m). Then on input x a witness for x can be found, 
if one exists, by running M,( (p, x)) for ,/?$$ steps, for all strings p of length at 
most log m, which can clearly be done in time t( 1x1). 1 
The definition due to Hartmanis has the advantage that the time to construct a 
string and the size of the description are both specified, so that some liner dis- 
tinctions can be made than using Levin’s Kt function. On the other hand, in this 
paper we find it convenient to have a function which measures the complexity of a 
string; Levin’s definition is much, better suited to this task than the definition of 
Hartmanis. 
The following easy proposition shows that the two notions are closely related. 
PROPOSITION 4. Kt(x) < r( 1x1) 3 x E K[r(n), 2”“‘] * Kt(x) < 2r( /xl). 
Some recent papers (e.g., [3, 73) have considered sets which are subsets of 
K[s(n), t(n)] for small s and t. Note that this approach tends to equate the 
Kolmogorov complexity of a language L with the complexity of the most complex 
strings in L. One goal of this paper is to show that there are reasons to be 
interested in the complexity of the least complex strings in L. To that end, we define 
the following measure of the complexity of strings in a set L. 
DEFINITION. Let LG (0, l}*. Define K,(n) to be equal to min{Kt(x):xEL’“} 
(If L=” = a, then K,(n) is undefined.) 
The rest of this paper can be viewed as an investigation into the properties of K,, 
for sets L in P. 
Note that there is a conflict between the notion of pseudorandomness and the 
notion of Kolmogorov randomness. If x is a pseudorandom sequence of length nk 
produced from a seed of length n, then x is a string of very low generalized 
Kolmogorov complexity. Many of the results in this paper are proved by taking 
advantage of this conflict. 
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5. PSEUDORANDOMNESS AND KOLMOGOROV COMPLEXITY 
In this section, we investigate hypotheses about the security of pseudorandom 
generators and derive necessary conditions, in terms of generalized Kolmogorov 
complexity, for these hypotheses to be true. 
LEMMA 5. Let r be any time-constructible function, such that r(n) < 2”. If there is 
a set LEDTIME such that K,(r(n))# O(n), then no extender computable in 
time n’ is (t(n), e(n)) secure, where t(n) 2 r(n) n’+ r(n)k and e(n) < d,(r(n))/r(n). 
Proof Let g be an extender computed in time n’. Assuming the existence of the 
set L in the hypothesis of the theorem, we will present a (t(n), e(n)) test which g 
fails. 
The test is simply this: on input y of length n + 1, run T(L, r(n), g), where 
T(L, r(n), g) is the test presented in Lemma 1. The time required to run the test is 
r(n) + r(n) n’+ r(n)k, and thus this is a t(n) test. 
Note that for all x E Z”, Kt( g,(,)(x)) d n + log(r(n) n’) + 0( 1) = n + log r(n) -t 
O(log n) < 3n for all large n. Since K,(r(n)) # O(n), there are infinitely many n such 
that g,,,,(F) n L = 0. I.e., there are infinitely many n such that Prob( g,,,,(y) E 
L/ y E Cn) = 0. By Lemma 1, we have that for any such n, 
P T(L,~,r(n)),n+,(~)-~~(~,g.r(n)),n+I(~~g)=~,(~(~))/~(~)>~(~). 
Thus g fails the (t(n), e(n)) test. m 
COROLLARY 6. Hypothesis 1 *for afl a.e. dense sets L E P, Vk, KL(nk) = O(n). 
COROLLARY 7. Hypothesis 3 *for all a.e. dense sets L E P, 3s > 0, K,(2”“) = O(n). 
Proof. To see that Corollary 6 is true, assume that there is a set L in 
DTIME(nk) and numbers s and r such that for all large n, L=” # @ + d,(n) > l/n” 
and K,(n’) # O(n). Let g be any extender computable in time n’. It suffices to show 
that g is not polynomially secure. This is immediate, since it follows directly from 
the lemma that g is not (rfn’ + nrk, l/nrs+ ‘) secure. 
Similarly, to see that Corollary 7 is true, assume that there is a set L in 
DTJME(nk) such that for all large n, L=” # Qj -d,(n)> l/n”, and for all E > 0, 
KL(2En) # O(n). Let g be an extender computable in time n’, and let 6 > 0. It s&ices 
to show that g is not (2’“, 2-a”) secure. Note that if E is chosen small enough, then 
2”” > 2~“~l + 2kcn, and 2-“n < ~,~sE”+c”. Now it follows from Lemma 5 that g is not 
(2’“, 2 -rin) secure. m 
Given an a.e. dense set L in P, and assuming that secure pseudorandom 
generators exist, Corollaries 6 and 7 allow us to conclude that L contains simple 
strings of many lengths, but we cannot conclude that it contains simple strings of all 
lenths. That is, it would be more satisfying if Corollaries 6 and 7 could be improved 
so that one could conclude that K,(n) = O(nllk) or K,(n) = O(log n), respectively. 
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but we do not know if such an improvement is possible. Although it is possible to 
improve these corollaries somewhat, to slightly expand the class of lengths about 
which some conclusions can be drawn, we are still only able to derive conclusions 
about a vanishingly small fraction of all lengths. On the other hand, the following 
lemma allows us to draw stronger conclusions from Hypotheses 2 and 4. 
LEMMA 8. Let s be any real-valued monotone increasing function such that 
log n <s(n). If there is a set L of a.e. density 2 l/n” which is accepted by a family of 
circuits of size nk such that K,(n) # O(s(n)), then no extender computable in time n’ 
is (t(n), e(n)), secure, for any t(n) 2 (s-‘(n + l))k + s-‘(n + 1) n’ and e(n) < 
l/(s-‘(n + l))“+ ‘. 
Proof: Assume that s and L are as given in the hypothesis. Let g be computable 
in time n’, and let t and e satisfy the given bounds. We must build a (t(n), e(n)) test 
which g fails for infinitely many n. 
We are given that there are infinitely many r such that KL(r) > 3s(r). For each 
such r, consider n = j-s(r) J and consider the behavior of the test T(L, r, g) on inputs 
of size n. The test can be computed by a circuit of size rk + rn’. Since s (and hence 
s-l) are monotone nondecreasing, it follows that r < s-‘(n + l), and thus the test is 
a t(n) test. 
Notice that for any string y of length n, Kt(g,(y)) < (n+2 log r) +log(rnk)+ 
O(1) c 3n for all large n. Thus for all of these n, Prob(g,(y) E L 1 FEZ”) =O, 
and thus by Lemma 1, &(I_, g, ?), n+ ,(K) - PTo_,g, rj, n+ l(PW = dL(r)lr 2 llrn+ ’ 2 
l/(s-‘(n + l))“+’ > e(n). Thus g fails the (t(n), e(n)) test. 1 
COROLLARY 9. Hypothesis 2 =S V’E > 0, K,(n) = O(n’) for all a.e. dense sets L in 
PlPolY * 
COROLLARY 10. Hypothesis 4=~ K,(n) = O(logn) for all a.e. dense sets L in 
PlPolY. 
Note that Corollary 6 tells us that, if Hypothesis 1 is true and L is an a.e. dense 
set in P, then K,(n) # o(n’) for any E > 0. The following lemma allows us to drop 
the “a.e.” condition on L. 
LEMMA 11. Let r be time-constructible and monotone increasing, r(n) < 2”, and let 
s be a monotone-increasing real-valued function such that s(r(n)) = n for all n E N. If 
there is a set L E DTIME(nk) such that K,(n) = o(s(n)) and d,(n) 2 nn i.o., then no 
extender computable in time nr is (t(n), e(n)) secure, for any t(n) > r(n + 1) n’+ 
r(n + l)k, and e(n) < l/r(n + l)“+2. 
Proof: Assume that L satisfies the conditions given above, and let g be an exten- 
der computable in time n’. Let A be the statistical test which, on input x of length 
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n + 1, probabilistically chooses b E {r(n), . . . . r(n + l)}, and then runs T(L, b, g), A 
runs in time r(n). Clearly, 
P A.n+,(R)-PA,.+l(PSg) 
1 
=r(n+ 1)-r(n) b cp T(L,g,b),n+I(R)-PT(L,g,b),n+,(PSg) 
d--c dL(b)-Prob(g,(y)ELlyEC") 
r(n+ 1) h b 
By assumption, for all large b, K,(b) > 3s(b) 2 3(s(r(n))) = 3n. Note also that for 
anyyoflengthn,Kt(g,(y))~n+log(bn’)+0(1)6n+logr(n+l)+O(logn)<3n 
for all large n. That is, for all large 6, Prob( gb( y) E L 1 y E Cn) = 0. Thus, by 
Lemma 1, for all large n, 
P . . ..(R)-P.,~+~(PSg)>~~~~ 1 Cd,(b). r(n+ l)* b 
Since d,(b)2 l/b”> l/(r(n+ 1))” i.o., we have that PA++,(R)- PA++,(PSg)>, 
l/(r(n + l))O+’ for infinitely many n. 1 
COROLLARY 12. Hypothesis 1 *VE >O, K,(n) #w(n”) for all dense sets L in P. 
COROLLARY 13. Hypothesis 3 =- K,(n) # o(log n) for all dense sets L in P. 
COROLLARY 14. Hypothesis 3 *every dense set in P has an infinite P-printable 
subset. 
Proof: It was shown in [3] that a set L is P-printable iff L is in P and for some 
k, L c K[k log n, n”]. Equivalently, L is P-printable iff L is in P and for some k, 
Kt(x) < k log n for all x E L. 
Now assume Hypothesis 3, and let L be a dense set in P. By Corollary 13, there 
is some k such that for infinitely many x E L, Kt(x) <k log n. Let A be the set of all 
strings y such that Kt(y) c k log n. It is easy to check that A is in P, and thus L n A 
is an infinite P-printable subset of L. 1 
6. THE POWER OF PROBABILISTIC AND NONDETERMINISTIC COMPUTATION 
In the previous section, hypotheses about the security of pseudorandom 
generators were shown to have consequences about the rate of growth of functions 
of the sort K,(n), where L is a sufficiently dense set in P. In this section, we show 
that the rate of growth of K,(n) is also closely related to various open questions 
about the relationships among deterministic, probabilistic, and nondeterministic 
complexity classes. 
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Hartmanis has raised the question of what can be said about the complexity of 
K[n/2, n3]. It seems unlikely that K[n/2, n3] is in P, although there is little hope of 
proving that directly, since K[n/2, n3] is in NP. Given that there is some vague 
intuition that K[n/2, n3] is not in P, it is tempting to suggest that behind that 
intuition, there is a feeling that polynomial-time machines cannot distinguish 
complex strings from easy ones. The belief in the existence of secure pseudorandom 
number generators is a manifestation of that feeling. The results in this section con- 
stitute an examination of the consequences of the hypothesis that, given a machine 
M which runs in polynomial time, if M accepts infinitely many complex strings, 
then M must also accept infinitely many noncomplex strings. 
First we must introduce the notions of a.e. complexity and bi-immunity. 
Following [ 151, we say that a set L is a.e. t-complex if every algorithm accepting L 
requires more than time t( 1x1) for all large inputs x. It can be shown [ 15, 341 that if 
T is a time-constructible function, and t(n) log t(n) = o( T(n)), then there is a set L 
in DTIME(T(n)) which is a.e. t-complex. 
A set L is said to be immune with respect to a class C of sets if L is infinite and 
has no infinite subset in C. L is bi-immune with respect to C if both L and its 
complement are immune with respect to C. As was pointed out in [ 151, the notions 
of bi-immunity and a.e. complexity are closely related. Specifically, if L is a.e. 
t-complex, then L is bi-immune with respect to DTIME(t(n)). Furthermore, if t is 
time-constructible and L is bi-immune with respect to DTIME(t(n)), then L is a.e. 
t-complex. (On the other hand, it can be shown that there are non-time- 
constructible functions t and sets L which are bi-immune with respect to 
DTIME(t(n)), but are not a.e., t-complex.) 
Combining the facts from the previous two paragraphs, we observe that if T is a 
time-constructible function and t(n) log t(n) = o(T(n)), then there is a set L in 
DTIME( T(n)) which is bi-immune with respect to DTIME(t(n)). The results below 
make use of this fact. 
THEOREM 15. 
DTIME(2’“‘“” 
Zf there is a set A E NTIME(&‘) which is immune with respect to 
) for all b, then 3L E DTIME(O(n)) such that K,(n) = o(s(n)). 
Proof Assume that every set L in DTIME(O(n)) has K,(n) # o(s(n)). It will 
suffice to show that for every A E NTIME(nk- ‘) there is some b such that A has an 
infinite subset in DTIME(2b”‘““). 
Let A be accepted by a nondeterministic machine M running in time nk- ‘. Let 
L = ( (x, y ): ) (x, y > I = nk and 1x1= n and y encodes an accepting computation of 
M on x} E DTIME(O(n)). By assumption, there is some c such that K,(n) < es(n) 
for infinitely many n. Let b > 2~. It is easy to verify that the following routine 
accepts an infinite subset of L in time 2’s(nk): 
Begin 
On input x of length n, 
For all z of length d cs(nk), run M,(z) for 2cs(nk) steps. 
PSEUDORANDOM GENERATORS 115 
If for some z3y, M,(z) prints out (x, y ) E L, accept. 
Else, reject. 
End 1 
COROLLARY 16. 3~ DTIME(2”‘) E NP * 36 3L E DTIME(O(n)), K,(n) = o(n”). 
Proof There is an infinite A E DTIME(2”“) which has no infinite subset in 
DTIME(2”‘) for any y <E. If A is in NP, then it is in NTIME(&‘) for some k. 
Choosing 6 < c/k satisfies the conditions of Theorem 15. 1 
COROLLARY 17. Let T(n) be any time-constructible function such that 
Vk, T(n) = o(n”). DTIME( T(n)) E NP = 3L E DTIME(O(n)), K,(n) = o(log n). 
(Equivalently, if every infinite set in P has an infinite P-printable subset, then NP 
does not contain any deterministic time class larger than P.) 
Proof: There is an infinite A E DTIME(T(n)) with has no infinite subset in P. 
The corollary now follows directly from Theorem 15. 1 
THEOREM 18. Zf there is a dense set A ERTIME(& ‘) which is immune with 
respect to DTIME(2’“‘“” ) for all b, then there is a dense L E DTIME(O(n)) such that 
K,(n) = 4s(n)). 
Proof. The proof of this result is really the same as the proof of Theorem 15. It 
suffices to note that the set L = ((x, y): I (x, y)l = nk and 1x1 = n and y encodes an 
accepting computation of M on x} eDTIME( has density d,(nk) 2 
d,(n)/2. I 
COROLLARY 19. 3e, DTIME(2”“) c RP = 36,3L E DTIME(O(n)), L is dense and 
K,(n) = w(n’). 
Proof. This is essentially the same as the proof of Corollary 16. It need only be 
noted that since there is a set AoDTIME(2”‘) which is bi-immune with respect to 
DTIME(2”‘) for all y <E, it must be the case that either A or its complement is 
dense. 1 
COROLLARY 20. Let T(n) be any time-constructible function such that 
Vk, T(n) = o(n”). DTIME( T(n)) E RP * 3 L E DTIME(O(n)) such that L is dense 
and K,(n) = w(log n). (Equioafently, zfeoery dense set in P has an infinite P-printable 
subset, then RP does not contain any deterministic time class larger than P.) 
The preceding four corollaries have the form K,(n) # o(s(n)) * DTIME(t(n) & 
NP (or RP), for various functions .s and t and conditions on L. In an earlier version 
of this paper [4], it was remarked that even stronger conclusions could be seen to 
follow; namely under the given hypotheses, one can conclude that DTIME(t(n)) @Y 
NPu coNP, since it can be shown that DTIME( t(n)) E NP u coNP * 
571/39/1-n 
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DTIME(t(n))s NP. In the meantime, it has been shown that a slightly stronger 
result holds; namely DTIME(t(n)) <f_ 11 NP =z= DTIME(t(n)) c NP [S]. 
Somewhat surprisingly, no further strengthening along these lines can be 
expected, since there is an oracle relative to which DTIME(t(n)) <$_ I, NP and 
DTIME(t(n)) SZ NP 151. 
The following results relate the K, complexity of dense sets in P/poly to the 
deterministic complexity of sets in RP. Note, in this regard, that there is nothing 
interesting to be said about the K, complexity of non-dense sets in P/poly, since a 
set in P/poly can consist of an infinite sequence of Kolmogorov-random strings. 
THEOREM 21. If RTIME(&) @ DTIME(t(n)), then there is an ae. dense set 
L E P/poly such that K,(n) defined=> K,(n) > log @). 
Proof Let A E RTIME(nkkDTIME(t(n)), and let Q be a linear-time predicate 
such that XEA o 3y, lyl = 1x1“ A Q(x, y), and furthermore xeA *at least half of 
the strings y of length 1x1“ satisfy Q(x, y). By Proposition 3, there is an infinite 
sequence xi, x2,... of strings in A such that VXi, Vy, (Q(Xi, y) * Kt(y) > Kt(y ) x) > 
log Jtcrxil,). A sssume without loss of generality that no two strings in the 
sequence are of the same length. Let L= {y: 3i IyI = lxilk A Q(xi, y)}. L is easily 
seen to be a.e. dense, and L is in P/poly, since it can easily be recognized using a 
family of circuits which has the sequence of x,)s hardwired in. Also, 
note that L’“# @*m=nk for some k and K,(m) = KL(nk) >log m= 
log&SF). 4 
COROLLARY 22. RP $ DTIME(2"')+36,3L~P/poly, L is a.e. dense and 
K,(n) = co(n’) (and thus K,(n) # O(n’)). 
Prooj Let A E RTIME(nktDTIME(2’“). By Theorem 21 there is an a.e. dense 
set L E P/poly such that K,(n) > (n”‘“)/2 everywhere that K,(n) is defined. Choos- 
ing 6 <E/k satisfies the claim. a 
COROLLARY 2.3. RP# P=-3L~P/poly, L is a.e. dense and K,(n)=o(log n) 
(and thus K,(n) # O(log n)). 
Proof Let A E RTIME(nk) - P, and Q be the linear-time predicate associated 
with A, as in the proofs of Proposition 3 and Theorem 21. Since A +! DTIME(n’) 
for all 1, it follows that there is an infinite sequence x1, x2, . . . of strings in A such 
that VI, Vy, (Q(x,, y) => Kt(y( xl) > (//2k) log n). Letting L = {y: 311 y( = (x,lk A 
Q(x,, y)}, it is easy to verify that L is a dense set in P/poly, and for all constants c 
and all large enough n, K,(n) delined*K,(n)>clog n. 1 
Whereas the results so far in this section have dealt with conditions of the form 
K,(n) = o(r(n)), the results which follow consider the condition K,(n) = O(r(n)). 
THEOREM 24. Let r(2”) be a time-constructible function. Zf; for UN LE P, 
K,(n) = @r(n), then NE c DTIME(2’(20”‘)). 
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Proof. Let A E NE be accepted by a NE machine M which runs in time 2”“, and 
let L E P be the set { y: ( y[ = mc and y encodes an accepting computation of M on 
input m}. (Recall that we make no distinction between a number and the string 
which encodes it.) By assumption, there exists some k such that, for all large m, 
K,(m”) < kr(m’) if L=“’ # $3. Thus the following deterministic algorithm runs in 
time 2r(201”‘) and decides membership in A; on input m of length n, search through 
the set of all strings y such that Kt(y) < kr(m’). If some string y E L such that 
/ yl = m” is found, halt and accept; else halt and reject. 1 
COROLLARY 25. If E #NE, then there is some L E P such that K,(n) # @log n). 
COROLLARY 26. rfNE vi &,, DTIME(22"), then there is some L E P and some 
E > 0 such that K,(n) # O(n’). 
Some discussion is called for, comparing these results to the results in the 
previous section, particularly Corollaries 9 and 10. Since it is often conjectured that 
nondeterministic computations cannot be simulated deterministically significantly 
faster than by the naive search strategy, it follows by Theorem 24 that it is often 
conjectured that there is no function r(n)=o(n) such that for all LEP, K,(n) = 
O(r(n)). On the other hand, if secure pseudorandom generators exist, then 
Corollaries 9 and 19 say that sulIiciently dense sets L in P (or even P/poly) must 
have K,(n) be quite small for many n. 
The preceding results allow us to draw certain conclusions from assumptions 
about the growth of functions of the form K,(n) for sets L in P. Unfortunately, 
however, some of the results in Section 5 give information only about functions of 
the form K,(nk) or KL(2”‘). The next few results deal with functions of the sort. 
THEOREM 27. i'f NTIME(2 O@*)) 6 n,,,DTIME(22"2) then there is some 
L E DTIME(O(n)) and some k E N such thet Kr(n”) # O(n). 
ProoJ: Let A E NTIME(2’“2) - DTIME(22”2), and let M be a nondeterministic 
Turing machine accepting A in the given time bound. Let L = { y: 3x, xc log X 6 1 yj < 
b+ 1) ‘(log -’ + ‘) and some prefix of y encodes an accepting computation of M on x}. 
Clearly, L’E DTIME(O(n)). Note that for all x E A, there is a string encoding an 
accepting computation of M on x in L, since xr log X d 2”“‘*. We must show that for 
some sufficiently large value of k, K,(nk) # O(n). 
Assume that K,(n“) < bn for all large values of n at which K,(nk) is defined. 
Then consider the following routine for accepting A: 
Begin 
On input x of length n, 
let m be the least such that xc“‘gX < mk < (x + 1 )‘(“‘gX+ ” 
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Search through all strings y such that K,(y) < bm. 
If some string y E L of length mk is found, halt and accept, else reject. 
End 
The time fequired to run this routine is 22bm < 22b((x+ l)e’o*x”Y’k which is less than 
2 2EL 1x19 = 22” ) assuming k was chosen sufficiently large. 1 
We remark that the time bound 2O(“‘) was chosen only in order to simplify the 
exposition. Similar results can be proved for NTIME(2°‘“‘“))) for any sufficiently 
“nice” superlinear function s(n). 
COROLLARY 28. If RTIME(2 0cn2)) & figs0 DTIME(22”2) then there is some ae. 
dense set L E DTIME(O(n)) and some k E N such that K,(nk) # O(n). 
THEOREM 29. Zf NTIME(2 Oc2”)) # DTIME(2°‘2”‘), then there is a set L in 
DTIME(O(n)) such that for all E > 0, KL(2En) # O(n). 
ProoJ The proof of this result is quite similar to the proof of Theorem 27. Let 
A E NTIME(2’2”) - DTIME(2°‘2”‘), and let M be a nondeterministic Turing 
machine accepting A in the given time bound. Let L = { y: 3x2’” < 1 y ) < 2’@+ ‘) and 
some prefix of y encodes an accepting computation of M on x}. Clearly, 
L E DTIME(O(n)). We must show that for all E > 0, K,(2”“) # U(n). 
Assume that K,(2”) < bn for all large values of n at which KL(2En) is defined. 
Then consider the following routine for accepting A: 
Begin 
On input x of length n, 
let m be the least such that 2’” < 2”” < 2’@+ i) 
Search through all strings y such that K,(y) < bm. 
If some string y E L of length 2” is found, halt and accept, else reject. 
End 
The time required to run this routine is 22bm < 22b(c(x+ l)“) = 20c2”‘. 1 
COROLLARY 30. ZfRTIME(2°(2”)) # DTIME(2°(2”)), then there is an u.e. dense set 
L in DTIME(O(n)) such that for all E > 0, K,(2”) # 0(n). 
At this point, we are finally in a position to relate assumptions about the 
existence of secure pseudorandom generators to consequences concerning 
probabilistic complexity classes. 
COROLLARY 3 1. 1. Hypothesis 1 = BPTIME(2°(“2)) c nalO DTIME(22”2). 
2. Hypothesis 2 * BPP E fi, ,0 DTIME(2”E). 
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3. Hypothesis 3 =+ RTIME(2°‘2”)) = DTIME(2°‘2’)). 
4. Hypothesis 4 z- RP = P. 
Proof Part 4 follows from Corollaries 10 and 23. Part 3 follows from 
Corollaries 7 and 30. Part 2 is from [ 121. It follows from Corollaries 6 and 28 that 
Hypothesis 1 =S RTIME(2 o(n2)) c nEzO DTIME(22”‘2), but the stronger claim of 
part 1 remains to be proved. 
By standard translational methods, it suffices to show that if Hypothesis 1 is true, 
then for all s>O, every tally set in BPTIME(nO”“g”) is in DTIME(2R”oe’). 
Let E > 0, and choose k so that l/k < E. Let g be any secure generator which takes 
inputs of length n and produces outputs of length nk. Let L be a tally set accepted 
by some BPTIME(b’ log “) machine M. The following deterministic algorithm 
determines membership in L: 
Begin 
On input 0” 
find m such that r~~‘~g~<rn~< (n+ l)c’og(n+‘J. 
for all strings x length m 
compute g(x) 
record if g(x) is a computation causing M to accept 0”. 
If at least half of the strings g(x) cause M to accept, halt and accept. 
Else, halt and reject. 
End 
The running time of this algorithm is 2’%O(‘) < 2(“+1)“‘0*‘“+““li < 22”‘0g”. If the 
algorithm is not correct, assume without loss of generality that it rejects infinitely 
many strings in L. That is, it must be the case that there are infinitely many strings 
0” such that a random sequence of coin flips of length n“ log ’ causes M to accept, 
but fewer than half of the pseudorandom strings of that length cause M to accept. 
That is, g fails the following probabilistic polynomial-time statistical test A: 
Begin 
On input y such that 1 yl = mk for some m, 
let n be the greatest integer such that nc’ogn < mk. 
Accept iffy is an accepting computation of M on 0”. 
End 
By the comments above, for infinitely many m, P,, ,,+(R) > a and P,, ,k(PSg) -=z 4. 
Thus g is not polynomially secure, contrary to our choice of g. 8 
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7. IMMUNITY PROPERTIES OF RP 
In this section we show that, under the assumption that secure pseudorandom 
generators exist, sufficiently dense sets in RP satisfy certain immunity properties. 
COROLLARY 32. Hypothesis 3 * every dense set in RP has an infinite P-printable 
subset. 
Proof: If A is a dense set in RTIME(nk), then the set L = ((x, y): y is a 
sequence of coin flips of length nk witnessing that XEA, and 1 yl = 1x1”} is a dense 
set in DTIME(O(n)). By Corollary 14, Hypothesis 3 implies that L has an infinite 
P-printable subset, S. Clearly, the set {y: (x, y) ES} is an infinite P-printable 
subset of A. i 
Thus, for example, Hypothesis 3 implies that there is an infinite P-printable set of 
primes. 
Hypothesis 3 is, of course, a very strong assumption. It turns out that a 
somewhat similar immunity property holds for RP, using the more commonly 
accepted Hypothesis 2. 
THEOREM 33. Hypothesis 2 * if L is a dense set in RP, then L x L has an infinite 
subset in P. 
Proof Assume Hypothesis 2 holds, and let L be a set in RP such that for some 
E < 1, d,(n) > 2”” i.o. (Note that we are assuming much less than density here; the 
claim holds even for sets of such “moderate” density.) 
As Yao has pointed out [39], if Hypothesis 2 holds, then for all k there is a 
probabilistic polynomial-time machine M, accepting L which, on input x E L of 
length n, flips only nllk coins and accepts with probability >$. (This machine M 
flips n’jk coins, and then applies a secure pseudorandom generator, and then uses 
the pseudorandom sequence to continue the computation.) In the same way, given 
any 6 < 1, one can construct a probabilistic polynomial-time machine M, accepting 
L which, on input x E L of length n, flips n coins and accepts with probability 
> 1 - 2-‘@. (This is accomplished by choosing k large enough, and simulating M, 
on n’ -(w) independent trials.) 
Let E < 6 < 1, let Q(x, y) be the predicate which is true if y is a sequence of coin 
flips causing M, to accept x, and let S= {(x, y): 1x1 = lyl A Q(x, y) A Q(y, x)}. 
Clearly, S is in P and S is a subset of L x L. It suffices to show that S is infinite; we 
show that for all n such that d,(n) > 2-““, there are strings x and y of length n such 
that (x, y) ES. 
Consider the square matrix with one row and one column for each element of L 
of length n, where position (x, y> is filled with a 1 or a 0 according to whether or 
not Q(x, y) is true. Since M6 accepts each x in L with probability > 1 - 2?‘&, there 
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are at most (2 -“‘) 2” strings y of length n such that Q(x, y) is false, and thus each 
row in the matrix has at least 
l’s in it. That is, more than half of the entries in the matrix are filled with 1’s. Thus 
there must be at least one pair (x, y ) such that positions (x, y ) and ( y, s > are 
both filled with 1’s. (In fact, there must be many such pairs) Thus (x, 4’) ES. 1 
Note that, for all sets L, L x L has an infinite P-printable subset iff L does. Also, 
L x L has an infinite r.e. or recursive subset iff L does. Furthermore, it is easy to 
show that, if P = NP, then L x L has an infinite subset of P iff L does. However, 
there are oracles relative to which there are sets L such that L has no infinite subset 
in P, but L x L does. (Sketch of proof: Let A be an oracle consisting of one 
Kolmogorov-random string for each of a very sparse set of lengths, so that (x E A, 
YEA, and x<y)*2’“’ < 1~1. Let L be the set {w: 30 (w( = Iu\ and WUEA or 
VW E: A}. Clearly, L x L has an infinite subset in PA. However, if S is a subset of L in 
PA, accepted by a polynomial-time oracle Turing machine M, then there is a Turing 
machine which, given n, the elements of A of length <log 2n, and a description of 
M, along with at most a constant number of extra bits of information, will print 
any given string in S. Thus if S is infinite, it contains strings of low Kolmogorov 
complexity, and thus is not a subset of L.) Thus, knowing something about the 
immunity properties of sets of the form L x L in RP seems to tell us little about the 
immunity properties of arbitrary sets in RP. 
If it could be shown that Hypothesis 2 + that every dense set in RP has an 
infinite subset in P, it would follow that Hypothesis 2 implies DTIME(t(n)) g RP. 
for any time-constructible superpolynomial function t(n), since for any such r(n 1 
there is a set in DTIME(t(n)) which is bi-immune with respect to P. 
Although the existence of sets L such that L x L is P-immune can be shown using 
standard diagonalization techniques, these techniques seem to require slightly more 
than exponential time. That is, it does not seem to be currently known whether or 
not there are sets L in DTIME(2”) such that L x L is P-immune, although such sets 
can be shown to exist in DTIME(2O’“‘). 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
A new measure of the complexity of a language L has been introduced in this 
paper. For any set L, K, is a function which measures, for each n, the time- 
bounded Kolmogorov complexity of the simplest strings in L of length n. We have 
shown that if secure pseudorandom generators exist, then K, grows slowly for all 
dense sets L in P or P/poly, and if hard sets exist in NE, then K, grows quickly for 
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some sets L in P. If RP # P, then K, grows quickly for some dense sets L in P/poly. 
Using the functions K, as a tool, we have shown that different hypotheses about 
the existence of secure pseudorandom generators imply the existence of fast deter- 
ministic simulations of probabilistic algorithms, although the nature of the sort of 
speedup which can be proved varies according to the sort of security which is 
assumed. 
In particular, we were able to show: 
1. Hypothesis 1 * BPTIME(2°(“2’) G nazO DTIME(22”2). 
2. Hypothesis 2 * BPP G n, , ,, DTIME(2”“). 
3. Hypothesis 3 * RTIME(2°(2”)) = DTIME(2°(2”)). 
4. Hypothesis 4 + RP = P. 
This paper considered some extremely strong hypotheses about the security of 
pseudorandom generators. In particular, Hypothesis 4 is so strong that it might be 
possible to prove that it is false. One possible approach to this problem is outlined 
here: For any k and x, let Ek(x) = { y: Kt(x 1 y) <k log n}; intuitively, Ek(x) is the 
set of strings y relative to which x is easy. There seems to be some relationship 
between the Kt complexity of x and the size of E,(x)nJ?“‘, since it is easy to see 
that Z”c Ek(On) for large enough k, whereas for most strings x of length n (and 
hence for all “random” strings) there are fewer than nk strings of length n in Ek(x). 
If there exists an infinite sequence of strings x such that Kt(x) grows faster than 
log x, but EL(x) is somewhat large, then Hypotheses 4 is false. More formally: 
THEOREM 34. If 3k, Vl, 3x, Kt(x) > /log n and IEk(x) n C1xl) > 2tXI/Jxlk, then 
Hypothesis 4 is false. 
Proof: Assume the hypothesis of the lemma is true, and for I= 1,2, . . . let xl be 
the string whose existence is guaranteed for each 1. Assume without loss of 
generality that i < j=t- (xi ( < Ixjl. Note that the set L = { y: 3x, 1x1 = (y( A y E Ek(x)) 
is in P/poly. By assumption, it is dense. Also, it is clear that L has no infinite 
P-printable subset, since if S is a P-printable set, then there is some I such that, for 
all x E S, Kt(x) c I log 1x1. By Corollary 10, Hypothesis 4 is false. 1 
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